Security & trust
konareef is built around explicit, declared trust boundaries. A reefpod states what it can access, what it can spend, and what evidence it produces. Every run leaves a verifiable custody proof. This page is for builders who ship pods and for evaluators who decide whether a pod is safe to run against company data.
The trust model at a glance
| Boundary | Declared by | Enforced by |
|---|---|---|
| Secrets | [dependencies].secrets (names only) | reef-core vault at spawn |
| Tools | [directive].tools_allowed / tools_denied | not enforced yet (declaration only) |
| Spend | [budget] (satoshis) | reef-core |
| Done / limits | [output] predicates | runtime |
| Evidence | custody proof | konareef verify |
Secrets
Pods never contain secret values. They declare the secret names they require. reef-core injects the values from its vault at spawn time. This keeps credentials out of source control, out of the published bundle, and out of proof logs.
[dependencies]
secrets = ["OPENAI_API_KEY", "GITHUB_TOKEN"] # names only — never values
Tools
Declare what the directive can invoke. Prefer an explicit allowlist over denying individual tools. These lists are a declaration only: reef-core does not enforce them yet.
[directive]
template = "./prompts/system.md"
tools_allowed = ["web_search"]
tools_denied = ["shell"]
Budgets
Budgets are spending limits in satoshis. A budget stops a run when its
recorded spend reaches max_sats. The run can spend somewhat
more than max_sats before it stops, and a stopped run fails.
A declared budget also makes a pod easier to approve inside a team.
[budget]
max_sats = 500
Proof
Every run on reef-core produces a signed custody proof. The proof binds what reef-core recorded the pod as doing: the model it used, the tool calls it recorded, the cost it recorded, and how its memory changed. It does not show that the list of tool calls is complete, and the cost is not checked against the model provider's bill. You can re-verify proofs offline:
konareef verify ./bundle # re-verify a konareef-bundle
konareef verify ./bundle --strict # stricter signature/attestation checks
A custody proof covers conformance, not quality. It shows what reef-core recorded about the run's model and spend. It does not show that the output is correct, useful, or fit for purpose. Quality is not a cryptographic property.
The proof also attests to what that reef-core instance recorded. It is an honest signed record, not a guarantee against a dishonest operator. See reef-core for the full trust model.
For privacy-sensitive pods, konareef supports disclosure policies. They
control how much of a run the proof reveals. This is selective
disclosure through --disclosure-policy, backed by a
zero-knowledge bundle. Choose the policy that reveals only what a
verifier needs. The zero-knowledge tier is not available on the
private beta.
Trusting a pod you can't personally audit
Commissioning a reefpod means you pay for a declared run with a spending limit. You do not buy the author's prompts or technique. A publisher can keep the pod's internals proprietary. A commissioner does not need to read them to trust the outcome. Three things carry that trust instead of a manual code review:
- konareef's audit filter —
pod.tomldeclares a pod's secrets (by name), tool access, and budget up front, so a reviewer can read these boundaries before a run. - The publisher's public reputation — a publisher identity signs every pod (a real cryptographic keypair, not an anonymous upload). Bad behavior is attributable to a known, rotatable identity, not a disposable one.
- Pod history and provenance — versions are immutable once published, and every run leaves a signed custody proof. You can check a pod's track record before you commission the next run: what reef-core recorded it costing and touching.
These three hold even for a pod whose prompt you have never read. pod.toml declares the boundary table above. The table says what is enforced today. The rest is the reputation and provenance layered on top of it.
Good vs. bad
Over-broad — vague, hard to approve, over-permissioned:
[dependencies]
secrets = ["OPENAI_API_KEY", "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID", "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY", "GITHUB_TOKEN"]
[directive]
task = "Do whatever it takes."
# no tool limits, no budget
Least-privilege — narrow, bounded, reviewable:
[dependencies]
secrets = ["GITHUB_TOKEN"]
[directive]
template = "./prompts/system.md"
tools_allowed = ["web_search"]
[budget]
max_sats = 250
Safe publishing checklist
- Does this pod need every secret it declares? Remove any it does not.
- Are secrets declared by name only, never embedded?
- Does
tools_alloweddeclare the tools the pod needs? (Declaration only: not enforced yet.) - Is a
[budget]declared with a sensiblemax_sats? - Does
[output]declare clear success/failure conditions? - For sensitive workflows, did you choose a disclosure policy so proofs do not leak inputs?
- Does
konareef pod validatepass cleanly?
Boundaries are declared in pod.toml and every run
is provable. So you can review a pod before it touches your data and audit
it afterward from its custody proof. Every field a pod reads goes to
the model provider as part of the prompt.